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Progressive Era Race Relations Cases
in Their "Traditional"Context
Mark V. Tushnet*
The pioneering African-American historian Rayford Logan
called the early years of the Progressive era the "nadir" of race relations in the United States.1 Historians and political scientists who
study the Supreme Court generally agree that Supreme Court decisions are rarely substantially out of line with the kind of sustained
national consensus regarding race relations that Logan described.
Professors Bernstein and Karman point to popular culture, including
the roaring success of D.W. Griffith's epic Birth of a Nation attacking
Reconstruction and defending the Ku Klux Klan, and elite opinion
such as the flourishing of scientific racism to demonstrate that there
was indeed a broad national consensus favoring policies of racial
subordination. 2 What then are we to make of Progressive era deci3
sions like Buchanan v. Warley?
Professors Bernstein and Klarman offer slightly different explanations for those decisions, and slightly different accounts of their
significance. Both agree that the result in Buchanan is best explained
as resulting from the Court's jurisprudential commitments. For
Professor Bernstein, those commitments were to what he calls
"traditional," as distinct from sociological, jurisprudence, 4 while for
Professor KIarman, the commitments were to enforcing at least, but
perhaps no more than, the minimal meanings of the Constitution's
language. 5 Similarly, both authors agree that Buchanan had little
*
Carmack Waterhouse Professor of Constitutional Law, Georgetown University Law
Center. B.A., Harvard University, 1967; J.D., MA., Yale University, 1971.
1.
RAYFORD W. LOGAN, THE NEGRO IN AMERICAN LIFE AND THOUGHT: THE NADIR 18771901 (1954).

2.

See David E. Bernstein, Philip Sober ControllingPhilip Drunk: Buchanan v. Warley

in HistoricalPerspective, 51 VAND. L. REv. 799, 801-03 (1998); Michael J. Klarman, Race and
the Court in the ProgressiveEra, 51 VAND. L. REV. 883, 896 (1998).
3.
245 U.S. 60 (1917). Having written about Buchanan before, I focus my comments on

it, with occasional references to Professor Klarman's account of other Progressive era cases. For
my discussion of Buchanan, see Mark V. Tushnet, Plessy v. Ferguson in LibertarianPerspective,
16 LAW & PHIL. 245, 249-50 (1997).
See Bernstein, supra note 2, at 806-22.
4.
5.
See Klarman, supra note 2, at 939-40.
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impact on residential segregation, and that the NAACP's success in
that case might have had some organization-building effects that
contributed to the development of the NAACP's vigorous litigation
campaign in succeeding decades. 6 Professor Bernstein emphasizes the
impact a ban on publicly mandated segregation would in theory have
on housing prices, and is a bit more sanguine than Professor Kiarman
about the possibility that a Court with a sustained commitment to
"traditional" jurisprudence would have stood in the way of public
policies that contributed to African-American subordination.
I agree with the main thrust of both Articles, and so these
comments raise questions around the edges of their arguments.
Professor Bernstein accurately describes sociological jurisprudence
and explains how its method of balancing competing social interests
systematically aligned the Court with views that prevailed in other
domains of public life. The Court's refusal to follow the precepts of
sociological jurisprudence in Buchanan, however, allowed it to perform what Professor Bernstein calls its "traditional role" as an elitist
counterweight to popular control of public poicy7 But Professor
Bernstein's description of the Court's "traditional" jurisprudence
needs sharpening.8

6.
See Bernstein, supra note 2, at 873-74; Kiarman, supra note 2, at 949-50. Professor
Kiarman also describes, more tentatively, how the Buchanan litigation campaign might have
had organization-building effects that contributed to the more vigorous civil rights movement of
'the 1950s and 1960s. See id.
7.
See Bernstein, supranote 2, at 875-77.
8.
Professor Bernstein's discussion of some collateral points could be more careful as
well. For example, contrary to Professor Bernstein's account, the common law did not broadly
require either integration or the provision of separate but equal facilities. See id. at 823. There
was a common law obligation of non-discrimination imposed on common carriers, but the class
of common carriers was not as broad as we might think. For example, the class included inns
serving travelers but not places of public accommodations generally. Further, it was a matter of
legal controversy whether the non-discrimination requirement entailed a ban on race-based
discrimination; cases litigating the issue in the Reconstruction era produced divided results.
And, finally, the common law common carrier obligations were not given the same
interpretation in every state. See Barbara Y. Welke, When All the Women Were White, and All
the Blacks Were Men: Gender, Class, Race, and the Road to Plessy, 1855-1914, 13 LAW & HIST.
REv. 261, 273-77 (1995) (describing common law rules). These deficiencies led Congress to enact
a general civil rights statute in 1875, held unconstitutional in 1883. See The Civil Rights Cases,
109 U.S. 3, 24 (1883).
Also, Professor Bernstein misunderstands the role that reasonableness plays in the Court's
opinion in Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896). See Bernstein, supra note 2, at 826-27. He
objects to the Court's reliance on public opinion in its analysis of reasonableness, treating this
as inconsistent with its "traditional" jurisprudence. But as I understand traditional jurisprudence, its function was to hive off areas from public control. Having decided that the statute
at issue in Plessy did not intrude on a protected area, the Court then considered the statute's
reasonableness. See Plessy, 163 U.S. at 548-49 (rejecting the plaintiffs constitutional
arguments and beginning consideration of whether assigning passengers to coaches by race "is a
valid exercise of legislative power"). In traditional jurisprudence, public opinion was always
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According to Professor Bernstein, the Court's "traditional"
jurisprudence centered on a substantive commitment against "class"
legislation. 9 This commitment had its origins in the Jacksonian attack on class legislation, which Jacksonians and their heirs understood to be the result of elite control of the organs of public policy. 10
The classic example of class legislation for Jacksonian jurisprudence
was the establishment of the Bank of the United States, which, as
Jacksonians saw it, resulted from the impact of the concentrated
The idea of class
power of wealth on the legislative process.
The
legislation became generalized as the century progressed.
specific emphasis on the concentrated power of wealth was
transformed into a concern about the impact of all forms of
concentrated power.
After the adoption of the Fourteenth
Amendment, the Court could fairly interpret the Amendment as
making Jacksonian jurisprudence the law of the land." Those who
followed and transformed Jacksonian jurisprudence believed that
class legislation disadvantaged ordinary, and unorganized, people.12
That is how the maximum work-hour law invalidated in Lochner v.
New York 1" could be seen as exemplifying class legislation: The
concentrated power of organized bakery workers overbore the
interests of unorganized consumers and unorganized individual
bakers. And it is how, as Professor Bernstein properly notes, the
statute upheld in Plessy v. Ferguson'4 could have been seen as class
legislation as well: The concentrated power of organized white racists
overbore the interests of less-organized African-Americans and whites
uninterested in segregation. The racial zoning ordinance that the
Court struck down in Buchanan also is an example of the kind of class
legislation that Jacksonian jurisprudence disapproved.
Professor Bernstein unfortunately blurs the concept of class
legislation in "traditional" jurisprudence as it was understood by its
adherents when attempting to connect the anti-class-legislation
analysis to Justice Harlan's dissent in Plessy, with its famous staterelevant to the determination of a statute's reasonableness; it was just that reasonableness
itself was not always a relevant legal criterion.
9.
See Bernstein, supra note 2, at 806-12.
10. See HOWARD GILLMAN, THE CONSTITUTION BESIEGED 33-45 (1993) (discussing
Jacksonian democracy's incipient role in the Lochner era).
11. I do not mean by this to suggest that such an interpretation of the Fourteenth
Amendment was the only one available to the Court, merely that it was available.
12. See GILLMAN, supra note 10, at 76-99 (discussing the class warfare spawned by
"impos[ing] brutalizing burdens on masses of people at the same time it showered
unprecedented splendors on a select few").
13. 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
14. 163 U.S. 537 (1896).

996

VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 51:993

ment that "[t]here is no caste here."15 In traditional jurisprudence
there is a difference between "class" legislation and "caste" legislation
that deserves emphasizing. From the anti-class-legislation perspective, Buchanan is an example of a broad class of special interest legislation, part of the same class as the statute in Lochner. In contrast,
an anti-caste perspective would link Buchanan with Plessy but not
with Lochner: Except in a metaphoric sense, legislation that disadvantages consumers and ordinary workers does not create a subordinate caste in the way that racial segregation does. The critical commentators on Buchanan whom Professor Bernstein cites understood
this when they stressed the role that property rights played in the
16
Court's analysis.
The difference between caste legislation and class legislation
raises another question. We know from Professor Bernstein's account
of sociological jurisprudence that the Court was not broadly committed to "traditional" jurisprudence. Why, then, was it deployed in
Buchanan but not in other cases? I suspect that the answer would
begin by noting that issues of race have always been special in constitutional law. Ordinarily, as Andrew Kull has argued, that specialness
has operated to the disadvantage of African-Americans. 7
In
Buchanan, it may have operated to their advantage. But the very
specialness of race in constitutional law then raises a question about
the extent to which Buchanan actually can be accounted for by reference to the Court's commitment to "traditional" jurisprudence, since
the Court does not actually seem to have been committed to it generally. Buchanan and the other Progressive era race cases suggest that
the Court was reaching, however hesitantly, toward a new transformation of Jacksonian jurisprudence. Having expanded from an attack
on the power of concentrated wealth to an attack on concentrated
power generally, that jurisprudence might have been in the process of
contracting into an attack on caste legislation, a particular form of
class legislation.
Professor Klarman also offers an explanation for the outcome
in Buchanan. While he stresses that it would be absurd to contend
that the Progressive era Court was leading a charge against caste
legislation, his alternative account seems to discount the shift in the
Court's constitutional perspective too much. Consider first Professor
15. Id. at 559 (Harlan, J., dissenting). This is not to deny that Harlan felt the pull of the
Jacksonian legacy, but only that his formulation in Plessy is not precisely the one a pure
Jacksonian constitutionalist would use.
16. See Bernstein, supranote 2, at 858-60.
17. See ANDREW KULL, THE COLOR-BLIND CONSTITUTION (1992).
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Klarman's discussion of Guinn v. United States.18 In describing the
state's grandfather clause exempting certain persons from the state's
literacy test, he notes that "it seems hard to imagine a more blatant
subversion of the Fifteenth Amendment, short of a facially race-based
suffrage restriction." 19 The Court treated the statute as "a surrogate
racial classification on its face and thus avoided any inquiry into
legislative motive."20 And yet, because the statute did not in fact use
the language of race, the Court did indeed go beyond what a minimal
reading of the Fifteenth Amendment would require. There is a difference between holding statutes unconstitutional when they use racebased classifications on their face, and doing so when they use some
non-race criterion "as a surrogate" for race, even when the surrogate
is nearly perfect. The former enforces a pure requirement of formal
equality alone, while the latter is a slight move in the direction of
invalidating on the basis of improper purposes. It would have taken
no more ingenuity than the Court displayed in the Guinn decision for
the Court seventeen years earlier to have invalidated the Mississippi
plan of disfranchisement.21 No more ingenuity, perhaps, but more
inclination, and that is what makes the Progressive era cases a puzzle: The Court was willing to push only a little beyond where it had
previously gone even though the minimal requirements of constitutionalism might have allowed it to rest in place.22
The same can be said of Buchanan. By 1917 the Court had
over forty years of precedents delineating the Reconstruction
Amendments' meaning. Two prominent decisions in particular were
available to the Court. The Court could have taken Pace v. Alabama23
and Plessy v. Ferguson24 to stand for the proposition that disabilities
imposed equally on whites and African-Americans did not violate

18. 238 U.S. 347 (1915); see Klarman, supra note 2, at 919-23 (discussing Guinn).
19. Klarman, supra note 2, at 921.
20. Id. at 922.
21. See Williams v. Mississippi, 170 U.S. 213, 225 (1898) (rejecting the black defendant's
challenge to an all-white jury drawn from voter registration rolls that were almost entirely

white because of election commission laws allowing discrimination).
22. Professor Klarman invokes minimal constitutionalism as well in his account of Bailey
v. Alabama, 219 U.S. 219 (1911). I am puzzled by his argument about Bailey. As he presents
the case, the Court relied on the fact that state constitutions barred states from criminalizing a
breach of contract to support its conclusion that statutes that "in substance" do the same thing
are violations of the federal Thirteenth Amendment. Kiarman, supra note 2, at 927. That
argument, whatever its merits, does not seem to me to represent something demanded by the
minimal requirements of the Constitution.
23. 106 U.S. 583, 585 (1882) (upholding a law against co-habitation between whites and
blacks that penalized both races equally).
24. 163 U.S. 537, 548 (1896) (rejecting a challenge to a statute requiring separate, but
equal, accommodations for blacks and whites on passenger trains).
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those Amendments. Professor Klarman argues that Pace and Plessy
were distinguishable from Buchanan in the terms established during
Reconstruction because the former cases involved social rights of
association, untouched by the Reconstruction Amendments, whereas
Buchanan involved property rights, which were at the core of the civil
rights that the Reconstruction Amendments' framers sought to protect.
Thus, he argues, anyone minimally committed to the
Reconstruction Amendments would have to find the ordinance in
Buchanan unconstitutional.2
I do not think Professor Kiarman establishes that the result in
Buchanan was compelled by a minimal understanding of the
Reconstruction Amendments. In retrospect, we can understand Pace
as involving social rights, but the Court did not have to understand it
in that way. One could equally characterize Pace as involving the
civil right to enter into a contract of marriage. 26 One committed to a
minimal reading of the Constitution might therefore have reasonably
concluded that after Pace and Plessy laws imposing disabilities
equally on whites and African-Americans did not violate the
Constitution, whether they dealt with civil or social rights.
That conclusion could be supported by the obvious proposition
that many clearly valid state laws imposed equal disabilities in the
area of civil rights-laws barring both whites and African-Americans
from selling liquor, for example. 27 And, finally, the animating purpose
of the Reconstruction Amendments, at its bare minimum, was to
eliminate disabilities imposed solely on African-Americans. Once
again, then, the ordinance in Buchanan was not "so obviously unconstitutional" that anyone with the most minimal commitment to the
Constitution would have to find it unconstitutional.
Professor Klarman's interest in "contextualizing" the Court's
decisions may have led him slightly astray.28 No sensible observer
25.
26.

See Kiarman, supranote 2, at 938-43.
Laws banning interracial marriages therefore interfered with the civil right to enter

into contracts. Strikingly, during the Reconstruction era debates, opponents of the Fourteenth
Amendment made this argument, and proponents of the Fourteenth Amendment had no
adequate response. See Mark V. Tushnet, The Politics of Equality in ConstitutionalLaw: The
Equal Protection Clause, Dr. Du Bois, and CharlesHamilton Houston, 74 J. AM. HIST. 884, 888
& n.15 (1987) (discussing the debates).
27. See, e.g., Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623, 661-62 (1887) (upholding a state law
prohibiting sales of alcoholic beverages).
28. Contextualizing Supreme Court decisions is the standard work of historians and political scientists, who sometimes have to be cautioned against the danger of overcontextualizing in
a way that eliminates the possibility that purely professional concerns-such as developing a
coherent doctrine that lawyers and judges can easily use-for developing defensible interpretations of the Constitution might actually occasionally matter. Professor Kiarman avoids this
mistake, but perhaps at the cost of asserting too strenuously the novelty of his approach.
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could plausibly contend that the Supreme Court can set itself against
a sustained national consensus on important public policies for any
substantial period. 29 All the terms of this formulation are important.
There must be a consensus rather than a close division in the polity;
the consensus must be national rather than local or regional; the
consensus must be sustained over an extended period (a decade or so);
the consensus must involve important rather than marginal policies;
and the Court must maintain its views over an extended period.3o The
Progressive era race cases fail on the last two counts. The policies
were not that important in light of available close substitutes,31 and
the Court's actions were not part of a general effort it sustained over a
32
decade.
One must be careful in identifying the relevant units of analysis when contextualizing a line of cases. The cases will almost certainly be roughly consistent with similar policies being adopted elsewhere in the polity. But we need not be surprised to discover that any
individual case, or even a handful of related ones, might be inconsistent with its political context. Professor Klarman's analysis gives
some, albeit limited, force to the minimal demands of professional
responsibility in interpreting the law, which may provide some opportunities for divergence between court decisions and policies developed

29. Considering the organization of government in the most general terms, we should be
astonished to discover a regime so organized that one of its institutions (the courts) could be at
odds with its other institutions on important matters for a sustained period.
30. The classic exposition is Robert A. Dahl, Decision-Making in a Democracy: The
Supreme Court as a NationalPolicy-Maker, 6 J. PUB. L. 279 (1957).
31. Substitutes included restrictive covenants and private rules segregating
transportation. See Joseph R. Palmore, Note, The Not-So-Strange Career of Interstate Jim
Crow: Race, Transportation,and the Dormant Commerce Clause, 1878-1946, 83 VA. L. REV.
1773, 1792-1804 (1997) (discussing the widespread use of segregated rail laws in the late 1800s).
As a general matter, since substitutes are ordinarily available, the Court can speak broadly
about apparently important social policies and yet have rather little impact on the way society
operates.
32. As Professor Klarman points out, when the Court confronted race issues again in the
1920s, its leading decisions-Gong Lum v. Rice, 275 U.S. 78 (1925), and Corrigan v. Buckley,
271 U.S. 323 (1926)--endorsed the system of racial subordination. See Kiarman, supra note 2,
at 935, 944 n.336.
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elsewhere. 33 Divergence from policies should also be unsurprising
34
when the court decisions have relatively little social impact.
What, then, accounts for Buchanan? As Professor Kiarman
notes, the Justices were committed to "rule of law" principles, which
meant that they could not uphold legislation blatantly inconsistent
with generally accepted constitutional principles. 35 But, I have argued, the statutes at issue in the Progressive era cases did not have to
be seen as gross violations of those constitutional principles.
Something more must have been going on. Several Justices probably
had a residual commitment to anti-class legislation. They and some
of their colleagues may have had a similarly residual commitment to
anti-caste principles. The Justices could have seen the two commitments converging in Buchanan and the other Progressive era cases.
The decisions do appear to have been modest moves in the direction of
a more "liberal" position on race than was found elsewhere in the law.
Professor Kiarman rightly stresses how modest the moves were, but
his rhetoric, with its emphasis on the minimal demands of legality,
understates the fact that the Court's decisions were moves in a new
direction.
In the end, I think the Progressive era decisions remain a puzzle. I believe, admittedly without much support, that some Justices
were uncomfortable with what they saw as the excesses of segregationist policies, although not with the core of segregation itself. They
used the Progressive era cases to express their discomfort. 36 Professor
Klarman points out that changes in the political context were incipient during the Progressive era. Some Justices may have sniffed these
changes in the wind. They might have been attempting to anticipate
the changes, or to use Alexander Bickel's image, to remember the

33.
This proposition could be specified more precisely in two ways, with different implications for questions other than the ones addressed here. First, it could be that national opinion
continued to require formal compliance with constitutional norms taken in a minimal sense, and
was content to let the judges decide what constituted such compliance. Second, it could be that
national opinion was indifferent or even opposed to minimal compliance, but that professional
norms did require such compliance, and the courts were in a position to follow the professional
norms.

34.

As Professor Bernstein suggests, the Progressive era decisions may have had the

conceptual potential to broaden into a more general attack either on caste legislation or on class
legislation in its broader sense. Professor Kiarman is surely right in suggesting that the more
significant the Court's decisions become, the less likely it is that any divergence between those

decisions and other public policies could be sustained.
35.

See Klarman, supra note 2, at 939-43.

36.

The Justices' willingness to overlook procedural impediments in the cases, which

Professor Kiarman details, provides some slight support for this thought. See Klarman, supra
note 2, at 939.
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future. 37 But because the changes were only incipient, their anticipations of the future were modest.
Admittedly, these decisions had little immediate material
impact. Segregation in housing, transportation, and education continued, and African-Americans remained effectively disfranchised
throughout the South. Professor Bernstein and Klarman both point
out that the NAACP's victory in Buchanan helped strengthen the
NAACP, and thereby assisted in laying the groundwork for the more
important role that it and other civil rights organizations would play
in the civil rights movement decades later.38 As Professor Klarman
notes, the conceptualization of constitutional rights as individual
rights in the McCabe case was a key legal argument that the NAACP
developed against segregation starting in the late 1920s. 39
More interesting, perhaps, is Professor Bernstein's suggestion
that Buchanan identifies a path not taken, which would have led to
greater civic equality. He would treat Buchanan as exemplifying the
"traditional" hostility to class legislation generally, and argues that
such hostility would stand in the way of the development of a caste
society. Following a generally libertarian and market-oriented line,
Professor Bernstein argues that conditions of civic inequality can be
sustained only with the assistance of state power: Sellers of products
and providers of services care only about cash, not color, and their
material interests eventually undermine efforts to sustain civic in40
equality in the absence of state sanction.
37.

ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE IDEA OF PROGRESS 102 (1970)

(discussing the future of the Warren Court's decisions).
38. See Bernstein, supranote 2, at 873-74.
39. See Kiarman, supra note 2, at 934. McCabe made available an argument that, when
pursued to the ends of its logic, would undermine segregation. This is different from saying that
the Justices who articulated the argument intended that result. Professor Kiarman does,
however, express some skepticism about those legal arguments' importance to the civil rights
movement's successes. It seems to me that Professor Klarman's rhetoric is unnecessarily
grudging. At times it seems as if he argues against the contention that sometimes judicial
decisions can have large-scale transformative effects. It is only a modest argument against that
contention that the particular decisions he is discussing did not have such effects, and it is
unnecessary for the purposes of that modest argument to demonstrate that the decisions had no
effects whatsoever.
40. Professor Kiarman addresses this argument in two footnotes, see Kiarman, supra note
2, at 941 nn.322-23. He argues that historically, "a strong emphasis on economic rights failed to
yield significant protection for other rights such as free speech or privacy." Id. at 941 n.322.
That, however, does not address the more general libertarian argument Professor Bernstein
offers: To a libertarian, government should interfere with neither property nor free speech
rights. For an account of early libertarian defenses of free expression, see DAVID A. RABBAN,
FREE SPEECH IN ITS FORGOTTEN YEARS 23-76 (1997). In addition, Professor Kiarman offers an

accurate description of the libertarian position as a criticism of Buchanan: "The same
[libertarian] notions that invalidate residential segregation ordinances can be invoked to invalidate civil rights statutes on the ground that the state should not interfere with the contractual
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As a speculation based on applying general economic theory to
particular markets at a specific time and place, this argument goes
well beyond the competence of lawyers-as-historians, and beyond our
capacity as lawyers-as-lawyers. I conclude only with this modest
observation. Contemporary liberals associated with the Democratic
party find themselves caught in a bind. 41 They argue that the material condition of African-American life today is quite terrible. Their
critics point to the same conditions as evidence that the liberal policies pursued in the 1960s were failures. 42 Liberals respond that the
1960s policies were not failures in themselves, but rather were not
pursued with sufficient vigor, and indeed were abandoned in the
"backlash" of the 1970s and thereafter. Their critics respond that
liberals were in charge of policy for a long enough period to demonstrate what the policies could actually accomplish. I find myself siding with the critics of liberalism in this argument. 43 Such critics differ
among themselves (or among ourselves) about the proper alternative
to liberal policies for the elimination of civic inequality, but there is no
doubt in my mind that the libertarian challenge to the poverty of
liberalism's policies is a substantial one.
freedom of employers or owners of places of public accommodation." Klarman, supra note 2, at
941 n.323. To which the libertarian response is: "And what exactly is the criticism here? We
believe, and have arguments based on our understanding of how markets work, that market
pressures undermine efforts to sustain a system of civic inequality. Civil rights statutes are
ordinarily unnecessary, and frequently perverse in their effects."
Finally, Professor KMarman points out that libertarianism makes government redistribution
of wealth impossible, which implies that racial minorities will "suffer" materially because they
are poorer than average. See id. In general, libertarians have several responses to this sort of
argument. One is a claim that libertarianism will unleash economic development that will raise
the material well-being of those on the bottom of the distribution of wealth to a greater degree
than government efforts at redistribution will, because of the effects such efforts have on the
incentives of those at the top of the distribution. Second, libertarians, skeptical about the way
in which the legislative process operates, argue that there is no reason to think that legislation
will re-distribute wealth from the rich to the poor.
Finally, and probably most important, libertarians distinguish between civic inequality,
which is normatively undesirable, and material inequality, which is a matter of normative
indifference within libertarian political theory (although libertarians have no objection to
private efforts to alleviate material inequality through private charity, and some may find the
charitable impulse a normatively attractive one). For a modern version of the libertarian
response, see RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, FORBIDDEN GROUNDS: THE CASE AGAINST EMPLOYMENT
DISCRIMINATION LAWS (1992). Epstein is more an eclectic critic than a libertarian one, but his
eclecticism encompasses libertarianism.
41. In describing contemporary liberals, I mean to make no large claims about liberalism
as a political theory in the abstract.
42. Some critics, in contrast, say that liberal policies were successful and that the
material conditions of African-American life are dramatically better than they were before the
1960s policies were put in place. See, e.g., STEPHAN THERNSTROM & ABIGAIL THERNSTROM,
AMERICA IN BLACK AND WHITE: ONE NATION, INDVSIBLE (1997).
43. I do not impute the views of these critics to Professor Bernstein or Professor Klarman,
whose Articles do not address the issue taken up in this paragraph.

